<em>Discretionary Managerial Behavior</em> presents a quantification of the managerial behavior within decentralized organizations. The volume provides practical insights into the internal functioning
of the firm, the relationships between the managers at different organizational echelons, and the conditioning effects of the organizational controls and the market environment external to the firm. It forms a basic
contribution to the theoretical modeling, methodological and estimation procedures, and empirical insights into the nature and operation of managerial discretion in decentralized organizations. <br/> Both theoretical
and empirical literature of organizational economics have not come to grips with the decision making process in such organizations. With this in perspective the volume describes four fundamentally new contributions. It
presents: <ul> <li> an approach to defining proximate objectives of managers at the divisional levels in a decentralized organization and the coordination by managers at higher levels, </li> <li> an
approach to developing a modelling framework from a sound theoretical perspective in order to reflect the postulated behavior, </li> <li> an approach to defining an estimation technique to operationalize both
(a) and (b) in a specific empirical context, and </li> <li> the richness of empirical insights which remained elusive for over thirty years. As such this study is an important step to make fundamental progress
in the area of interface between business policy and microeconomic theory. </li> </ul>