This book examines some ideological issues behind
the academic debate that surrounds the new field
called evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary
psychologists make three key claims about the mind.
The first is that the mind is massively modular; the
second is that this massively modular mind is shaped
by the processes of natural selection over
evolutionary time; and the third is that it is
adapted to the Pleistocene conditions of our past.
Evolutionary psychologists seek to elevate these
three claims to the status of meta-theoretical
assumptions making them the starting place from
which our deliberations about human cognition should
proceed. These claims would constitute the framework
for a new paradigm in the ultimate sense. However,
elevating these claims to paradigmatic status is not
only premature but also unwarranted on the available
evidence. This result is justified by evidence
produced outside evolutionary psychology by
researchers in biological anthropology, empirical
linguistics and developmental psychology from whom
the evolutionary psychologists explicitly seek to
distance themselves.